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ESSAY
DEALING WITH THE LIMITS OF VISION: THE





Over forty years ago Professor Karl Llewellyn, the principal archi-
tect of the Uniform Commercial Code, advised lawyers that if they saw
themselves as troubleshooters and forward planners with skills for sizing
up situations and getting things done, and made those skills known as
characteristic of the profession, there would be good work to do.' This
marketing advice was offered at a time of national crisis, when the coun-
try was emerging from World War II and there was a perceived lack of
utility for lawyers. Since then lawyers have proliferated-and found
good work to do-and we have all come to look on ourselves (and be-
lieve we are looked upon) as troubleshooters and forward planners with
the ability to get things done.
We are not trained in law school to be troubleshooters or forward
planners. We become that. Our work demands that we develop such
skills and polish them, but the skills begin to develop in law school, if you
reflect on it, not from the formal course instruction but from reading
endlessly in cases about how things have gone and can go wrong-which
is usually not the reason we are assigned the cases or the subject matter
of legal teaching. We are expected by the public to finish law school a
little more critical of human nature (and thus more worldly) than others
not educated as lawyers, an outcome which is also not the subject matter
of the teaching. In other words, it is expected that the education to be
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provided by our legal schooling will comprise more than we are taught in
law school. And in that observation we are saying there is a failure in the
teaching.
2
Let us look in this essay at what we are taught, what it is that we
learn, and what legal education may be capable of teaching us. In the
process we will look at the way the traditional legal curriculum divides
the law into two archetypal points of view, that of the advocate and of
the counsellor, and uses the case method to explore advocacy without
fully developing the counsellor's perspective. We will then analyze four
cases dealing with the close corporation (which are themselves lessons in
such diverse subjects as estate planning, real estate, corporate mergers,
executive compensation, and federal jurisdiction), first following the con-
ventional advocate's analysis and then, in what we believe is a novel ap-
proach, following the counsellor's perspective. Using this approach, we
will derive rules to be used in the planning process, rules designed to
extend the limits of the planner's vision. In the process we will provide
the outline for a new type of course and course materials and show that
the traditional dichotomy between the role models of advocate and coun-
sellor is an arbitrary construct.
LEGAL TRAINING
Lawyers are trained to be advocates. Regardless of the use to which
the law is put, legal training begins, and often ends, with the analysis of
argument. Opinions of appellate courts are scrutinized for the persua-
siveness of the argument. Majority and dissenting opinions are not given
2 The recent literature on the perceived crisis in legal education is extensive. See Brown,
The Trouble with Law School Education: A Consultation as a Microcosm, 18 Creighton L.
Rev. 1343 (1985); Clark, The Return of Langdell, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 299 (1985);
Duncan, Teaching Legal Skills for Transfer of Learning: Is Simulation the Answer? 2 J. Prof.
Legal Educ. 64 (1984); Ely, Through a Crystal Ball: Legal Education-Its Relation to the
Bench, Bar and University Community, 21 Tulsa L.J. 650 (1986); Feinman, Reforming and
Transforming, 30 N.Y.L. Seh. L. Rev. 629 (1985); Fetters, A Personal Reflection on Legal
Education, 36 Syracuse L. Rev. 933 (1985); Gorman, Assessing and Reforming the Current
Law School Curriculum, 30 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 609 (1985); Horwitz, Are Lav Schools Fifty
Years out of Date? 54 UMKC L. Rev. 385 (1986); Kennedy, The Political Significance of the
Structure of the Law School Curriculum, 14 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1 (1983); Komgold, Legal
Education for Non-Litigators: The Role of the Law Schools and the Practicing Bar, 30 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 621 (1985); Scott, Legal Education: Proposals for Change, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 317 (1985); Vernon, Education for Proficiency: The Continuum, 33 J. Legal Educ. 559
(1983); White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought (and Ought
Not) to Be, 36 J. Legal Educ. 155 (1986). These problems are also dealt with from a histo-
rian's perspective in R. Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to
the 1980s (1983). In preparing this Essay, we also referred to Ad Hoe Committee on Lawyer-
ing, Evaluation of the Educational, Institutional and Fiscal Implications of the Proposed
Lawyering Program (April 3, 1985) (unpublished memorandum to the faculty of New York
University School of Law on file at New York University Law Review).
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any particular favor; each must meet the test of accounting for all the
facts of the case, explain the place of the subject matter in the body of
precedent or the statutory scheme, and be persuasive. Such training ap-
proaches the law as if it were divided into the polar extremes of advo-
cate's law and counsellor's law3-and ultimately divides the law in our
minds into those opposing points of view. The descriptions that follow
illustrate the conventional understanding of the contrast between the ad-
vocate and the counsellor.
Advocate's law is law seen from the point of view of the advocate
seeking to obtain a fair result, usually in the individual case. Advocate's
law views the law as uncertain, subject ultimately to being shaped by
persuasive argument. Argument addresses and encourages judicial dis-
cretion; planning considerations are given only limited weight. Advo-
cate's law attempts to set the law free from many of the constraints of
precedent and is therefore often irreverent. Although in every argument
there is an argument for the status quo, advocate's law often embraces
change. And change, given a result perceived as fair, is exciting, offering
a sense of the advancement of justice, an enrichment of shared morality.
Change satisfies our need for movement, accommodation, and a sense of
flexibility in the established order. Embracing change, advocate's law is
looked on as dynamic.
In contrast, counsellor's law is the law applied prospectively to be-
havior. Counsellor's law is the law of rules and their application; plan-
ning considerations are given great weight. It therefore concerns itself
largely with legal doctrine, the body of prescriptive rules that governs
our society.4 Application of such rules is often considered static when
compared to advocacy. These rules are usually not given much attention
in law school or, if they are considered, are made to look more suscepti-
ble to change than is the case.
In this view of the law, and of the role of the lawyer as counsellor,
the counsellor describes risks and draws lines that limit behavior; he is
often described as conservative. Also in this view of the law, counsellors,
for the most part, do not make law. For them, in the moment of chal-
lenge, the reward is a declaration that the law is as they thought it to be.
Advocate's law is taught and promoted in the law schools, while
counsellor's law is often ignored. The knowledge necessary to be a coun-
sellor is regarded as a by-product of the teaching, an accretion to the
student's knowledge that comes over time, after the course material of
law school has been mastered. There are many reasons for this result.
3 The contrast of advocate's law and counsellor's law is developed in Llewellyn, supra
note 1, at 167-69.
4 Llewellyn describes these rules as having "bedrock status." Id. at 168 n.3.
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Advocate's law is analytical and is therefore entertaining to teach and
enlightening for both student and teacher. Advocate's law is issue-seek-
ing. Although it differentiates and distinguishes complex facts and there-
fore embraces complexity, it is relatively easy to impart to students, as
they need have little substantive knowledge to participate in the process.
It is often normative rather than descriptive: it tends to concentrate on
the way things ought to be rather than on the way they are. Accord-
ingly, it appeals to the student's own idealism, offers immediate rewards,
and without doubt engenders an appreciation of the law as a flexible in-
strument. Moreover, it encourages the examination of the reasons for
rules, the policies behind them, and the limitations of their application.5
Conversely, counsellor's law seeks simplicity. Complex arrange-
ments usually prove difficult to negotiate or document, and obedience to
rules requires straightforward prescriptions that can be followed. Since
counsellor's law deals with the application of rules, an examination of the
policies behind the rules is often not required.6 A counsellor can func-
tion quite well without making a historical inquiry into the evolution of,
or the policies underlying, a rule, just as the precise use of language does
not ordinarily require an investigation of the etymology of the words
used. This fact is perceived to demean counsellor's law, to make it less
intellectual than advocacy, aligning counsellor's law, in the definitional
framework, with the rote learning of rules. The better the law school
(and, by extension, the better the legal education), the more the student is
made to look at the reasons for things rather than merely to learn legal
doctrine or certain related substantive rules. The better the law school,
the more the mastery of substantive rules becomes the student's own
obligation.7
5 Advocate's training in law school thrives on policy analysis: such analysis is fodder for
every advocate. The limits of policy analysis are explored in Duncan Kennedy's article on the
politics of the law school curriculum. "There is now policy analysis of every possible stripe,
and it has gradually become clear that a skillful person using the policy approach can generate
a resoundingly convincing rationale for any rule. There is no existing rule that cannot be
legitimated by reference to some set of social policies." Kennedy, supra note 2, at 8.
Kennedy explains that mastery of policy analysis has an interesting consequence-it can
turn out to be entirely empty.
If you're good at this kind of analysis you can actually feel your own ambivalent, switch
hitting, go-any-direction capacity. Policy can be used to show that every rule is neces-
sary, should be the way it is, has been the way it is for a good reason, or it can be used to
show that any part or even the whole system should be junked.
Id. The sense of emptiness engendered by this method can lead the student to a search for the
bedrock in the system.
6 To present sharply the contrast between the points of view of the advocate and the
counsellor, our description ignores a problem that often faces the counsellor: determining the
direction in which the law is heading and the effect any changes in this direction may have on
his position.
7 As a corollary, it often seems that the better the law school, the less the school offers the
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The law school education is thought of as supplying an apperceptive
mass of information to facilitate the future accumulation of knowledge.
The school may offer a course that is called "counselling," but that is
likely to be practical training, akin to moot court. Courses in transaction
planning also miss the mark for they are, as will be seen, only tangen-
tially related to the counsellor's role.8 The intellectual aspects of coun-
sellor's law are not fully explored.
The legal training that we have described is not the training of plan-
ners or troubleshooters or wise counsellors. 9 Law school education, ac-
cording to received wisdom, trains people to think like lawyers. A
description of what it means to think like a lawyer is a reiteration of the
training process. It is assumed, however, that in teaching the student to
think like a lawyer, legal training covers the role of the counsellor and
that there is not much difference between applying rules to the facts in a
historical context and applying them prospectively. After all, rules can
be applied to facts whether the facts are about what happened yesterday
or what will happen tomorrow. In reality, however, there is a great deal
of difference. When one is dealing with historical facts, most facts can be
known. When one is planning for the future, many facts may be known,
but many may never be known. From any course of action consequences
arise for which there will be responses and counter responses and so on:
there is a limit to the vision of the planner.
Troubleshooting and planning go hand in hand. The troubleshooter
comes in where planning has not worked or may not work, where the
planning must be redirected. Important to both the planner and the
troubleshooter is the intelligent application of experience: understanding
the likely consequence of a course of action. The essence of planning is
the positioning of the parties so that problems, even though unantici-
student in terms of intellectual content in third-year courses. This may be one reason for the
sense of ennui with respect to certain aspects of legal education that manifests itself in stu-
dents' restlessness in the third year of law school. See Gorman, supra note 2, at 617-19.
Nearly 15 years ago, Robert Stevens observed that
[i]n short, the popular conception of law student life as a mixture of long hours pouring
over casebooks and endless discussions of the contents of those books is more myth than
reality. By the fifth semester, many students have the equivalent of a two-day work
week and discuss their studies rarely, if at all.
Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551, 653 (1973).
8 One observer has noted that traditional planning courses are often stigmatized as "how
to" courses, lacking in intellectual rigor. See Korngold, supra note 2, at 624.
9 Professor Robert A. Gorman notes that the most prevalent criticism practitioners level
at legal education is that "law school seems to cripple the capacity for reaching a single con-
structive solution and for implementing it." Gorman, supra note 2, at 611. He observes that
legal education often seems to concentrate on sniping at the opinions of others, while practi-
tioners spend much more of their time "eliciting facts, formulating issues, sketching alternative
courses of action, choosing among them, structuring transactions, and counseling others." Id.
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pated, will not destroy the desired result, including the devastation that
can be wrought by changes in the law or the imposition of judicial
discretion.
SUBJECT MATTER FOR REFLECTION
The case system has long been a model for teaching advocacy. The
cases deliver arguments and convey rules and, for the most part, that is
the reason they are used for teaching. But the cases also convey experi-
ence about how people act and how they deal with each other, about
what went wrong or what often goes wrong in particular situations.
With some thought on the student's part, the cases also convey informa-
tion about how to fix the problem or cut the losses. The experience of the
cases is often the richest part of the law school education, but we are not
taught how to seek out or use that experience. The experience of the
cases, along with an understanding of the limitations of the analysis of
argument, is what really supplies the maturity that we associate with the
completion of legal education.
It is worth comparing what we read in law school and what we are
taught from the cases with the intellectual content that the counsellor, as
the master of the experience of the cases and the law (and thus as plan-
ner), distills from them. In Karl Llewellyn's words, "[T]heory does well
to keep its feet on the earth."' 10 Corporate law is our field and, accord-
ingly, we will use cases we know as illustrations.
Cases involving the close corporation have content that conveys ex-
perience. They generally involve more than one area of the law and thus
require the integration of legal knowledge. Also, an analysis of these
cases looking for the "fair result" yields surprises. If you have confi-
dence in your understanding of the subject matter, which you can gain
after reading a few cases, you have a window on our society. The subject
matter reflects the stresses of capitalism. These are stresses that every
business lawyer comes to know. Let us start with something as basic as
entering and leaving the corporate form, using the close corporation with
a limited number of stockholders as a model. We will restrict the illus-
trations to four cases, review them from the conventional analytic point
of view, and then assess them from the planner's perspective. This re-
view will give us a basis for reconsidering the types of courses offered in
law school, the course materials, and, finally, the counsellor's role.
Illustrative Cases
Indigenous to the close corporation are the problems of the illiquid-
10 Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 167 n.
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ity of its securities and the possible death of one or more of its stockhold-
ers. These are fundamental problems that must be addressed by anyone
contemplating business in the corporate form.
Case 1
Ideal as a first case for analysis is Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp. 11 In
Allen, the corporation's bylaws provided that, in the event of the death of
a stockholder, the corporation would have the right to buy the deceased
stockholder's shares at the price the stockholder originally paid when he
acquired them from the corporation. 12 This bizarre arrangement ap-
proaches the classic tontine13-pure economic Darwinism in which the
survivor takes all. In Allen, upon the death of one of the stockholders,
the corporation proffered an amount that was more than the original
purchase price of the stock but significantly less than its fair market
value.14 The estate contested the price and the trial court found for the
corporation. 15 The Appellate Division reversed because of the "unfair-
ness" of the price specified in the bylaws. 16 The Court of Appeals, in an
opinion by Judge Fuld, found for the corporation and reinstated the trial
court's opinion.' 7 Simply stated, the court did not want to encourage
litigation over the formula that had been chosen. Litigation would de-
stroy the utility of such arrangements.
The Allen decision is atavistic in its purity, looking back to an earlier
age of doctrine. Freedom of contract is treated as absolute in this con-
text. The court had an opportunity to equivocate and open the door to
altruism,18 for the estate raised an issue of waiver on the part of the cor-
II 1 A.D.2d 599, 153 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1956), rev'd, 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
12 Id. at 600, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
13 A financial arrangement, named after its creator, the seventeenth-century banker Lo-
renzo Tonti, in which a group shares in some advantageous arrangement or fund, such as an
annuity, on terms such that upon the death or default of any member, his share is distributed
among the remaining members of the group, until the last survivor receives all. The tontine
may be familiar to some from the plot of the 1966 movie, The Wrong Box, based on a story by
Robert Louis Stevenson.
14 Allen, 1 A.D.2d at 602, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
15 Id.
16 See id., 153 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
17 See Allen, 2 N.Y.2d at 543-44, 141 N.E.2d at 817, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25.
18 Altruism is a term that Duncan Kennedy uses to describe the "socialization of our the-
ory of contract." Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685, 1687 (1976) (quoting F. Kessler & G. Gilmore, Contracts, Cases and Materials
1118 (2d ed. 1970)); see id. at 1717-22. Kennedy posits the substantive dichotomy of individu-
alism and altruism and adopts the dialectical method (or method of contradictions) to explore
the positions. This is the Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis from which emerges a
synthesis. See id. at 1712 n.73. While Kennedy explores individualism and altruism bril-
liantly, no synthesis emerges.
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poration in an all-out effort to have an equitable argument insinuated
into the situation. The court, however, dismissed this argument. Free-
dom of contract is given full measure, even if the parties have embraced a
tontine, not often sensible in a business context. 19 Accordingly, rock-
solid legal doctrine is established.
The firmness of Judge Fuld in this 1957 case, and of the New York
Court of Appeals, appeared to set a clear path for guidance in the close
corporation from a court that was, at the time, the country's leading arbi-
ter of corporate law. How reliably would that firmness be maintained?
One case, as we all know, does not inevitably set the law.
Case 2
Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp. 20 provides a vantage point from which
to observe the issue from another perspective and in greater depth. The
problems inherent in this situation are apparent from a simple recitation
of the facts.
In Nelkin, three groups of stockholders incorporated a building (the
realty corporation), and the three corporations they respectively con-
trolled became the building's tenants at a substantially discounted rental,
well under fair market value.21 The realty corporation issued fifty-four
shares, which were held by the stockholders of the three tenant corpora-
tions or, in one case, by the tenant corporation itself. The corporations
were Chatham Metal Products, Inc. (Chatham) (the three stockholders
of which, Nathan Horowitz, James Horowitz, and Charles Richter, each
individually received six shares of the realty corporation), National Ma-
chinery Exchanges, Inc. (National) (the sole owner of which was Irving
Epstein, who individually received eighteen shares), and Henry Nelkin,
Inc. (Nelkin) (the sole owner of which was Henry Nelkin, and which
19 It is difficult to determine from the Alien opinion what purpose the buy-back provision
was intended to serve. The Appellate Division noted that Biltmore Tissue Corp.'s stock ap-
peared to be widely held, as the company's bylaws provided that no individual or corporation
was entitled to hold more than 20 shares, and 5,538 shares were outstanding. Allen, I A.D.2d
at 601, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 782. Since Judge Fuld identified the stockholder whose estate con-
tested the provision as having been a paper jobber and one of Biltmore's customers, 2 N.Y.2d
at 538, 141 N.E.2d at 813, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 419, one can speculate that it may have been
intended that the corporation would be owned exclusively by its customers. Conceivably, the
stockholders were meant to benefit by having access to the company's products and were not
intended to profit from any increase in the value of their stock ownership. Unless there were
some such collateral benefit from stock ownership, it is difficult to understand why anyone
would have purchased the stock on the terms offered. If such a corporate purpose was in-
tended, however, the bylaws were apparently silent on the matter, and by the time the matter
reached the court the purpose was no longer documentable.
20 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969).
21 Id. at 546, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
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held eighteen shares as a corporate asset).22 The building was apparently
incorporated in 1941, and until 1961 Chatham, National, and Nelkin oc-
cupied most of the space in the building.23 In 1946, Charles Richter sold
his interest in Chatham but retained his shares in the realty corporation,
and in 1961, Nelkin terminated its tenancy in the building. 24 After
Nelkin vacated the building, Chatham and National took additional
space, 25 and at the time of litigation, Chatham intended to take addi-
tional space upon the vacancy of an unrelated tenant. 26 Charles Richter
and Henry Nelkin, who controlled four-ninths of the issued stock but no
longer rented any space, tried to convince the stockholders of Chatham
and National, who controlled the other five-ninths, to disregard the
stockholders' agreement that permitted the discounted rentals and re-
form the agreement by paying a fair rent for the space leased or, alterna-
tively, either to sell the building and distribute the proceeds or to buy the
minority shares at a reasonable price. 27 In response, the majority offered
to pay Richter and Nelkin what they had paid for the shares in 1941, a
proposal that is reminiscent of the buyout arrangement in Allen. 28
Nelkin and Richter instituted an action seeking judicial dissolution
of the corporation as deadlocked in accordance with section 1104(c) of
the New York Business Corporation Law.29 The majority of the court
found that Nelkin and Richter had not stated a cause of action for
judicial dissolution, because there was no deadlock.30 Judge Fuld dis-
sented. Fuld attempted to imply a condition in the arrangement: that
the existence of the corporation was conditioned upon each stockholder's
continuing as a tenant in the building. 31 Judge Fuld was of the view
that if the corporation no longer fulfilled the function for which it was
organized, that is, to serve all the tenants, then the court should not hesi-
tate to direct dissolution. 32 Judge Fuld had been the author of a line of
opinions endorsing judicial dissolution: Leibert v. Clapp33 and Kruger v.
22 Id. at 546 n.1, 255 N.E.2d at 714 n.1, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456 n.1.
23 See id. at 546, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 550, 255 N.E.2d at 717, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 547, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
27 Id. at 546, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
28 See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
29 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(c) (McKinney 1986).
30 See Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 549-50, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
31 See id. at 551, 255 N.E.2d at 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 552, 255 N.E.2d at 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
33 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963). The complaint in Leibert
sought dissolution, alleging that the directors and other control persons of the corporation had
for many years been looting its assets with the goal of forcing the minority stockholders to sell
out to the majority. Judge Fuld, adopting a style and tone reminiscent of a celebrated opinion
on fiduciary duty by Judge Cardozo, see Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545
(1928), determined that the complaint should not be dismissed. "Settled beyond peradventure
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Gerth.3 4 Continuing this theme, in his dissent in Nelkin, Judge Fuld
stated that, when changing circumstances render fulfillment of the pur-
poses for which the enterprise was organized impossible, a court of eq-
uity could and should dissolve the corporate entity.35 Judge Fuld
encouraged a position that would permit the court to review bargains to
determine whether they have become onerous and to terminate them if
they have become unfair as a result of changes over time.36 Neither the
Fuld dissent nor the Nelkin court tries to reconcile its views with those
expressed in Allen, and, in all likelihood, neither was aware that the cases
are related.
It is interesting to examine Judge Fuld's analysis in light of the di-
lemma of Charles Richter, who was the longest-suffering nontenant
stockholder. Richter sold his interest in Chatham in 1946. His problem
was that the shares in the realty corporation were held by the individual
stockholders of Chatham and not by Chatham itself. If the shares had
been held by Chatham when Richter severed his interest in Chatham, he
would not have found himself a stockholder in the realty corporation
without any ability to reap the benefits of the undermarket rental. The
lawyer who drafted the agreement probably made a planning error in the
original decision as to how the Chatham shares should be held. 37 Judge
Fuld's argument works best when directed solely toward Nelkin's di-
lemma, but Nelkin was not as long-suffering as Richter and, standing
alone, might not have tipped the balance in favor of judicial dissolution,
even in Fuld's view.
3s
is the proposition that, in cases such as this, directors and stockholder majorities-constituted,
as we have said, guardians of the corporate welfare-are cast in the role of fiduciaries and must
exercise their responsibilities as such with scrupulous good faith." Leibert, 13 N.Y.2d at 316-
17, 196 N.E.2d at 542, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
34 16 N.Y.2d 802, 806-07, 210 N.E.2d 355, 357-58, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-5 (1965) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting). Judge Fuld dissented in Kruger, which involved a corporation whose majority
stockholder, also an officer, drew, over a period of years, salary and bonuses that were several
times greater than the net corporate earnings that remained after their payment. The majority
found no grounds for dissolution. See id. at 804, 210 N.E.2d at 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 2. Fuld
argued in dissent that a majority stockholder's fiduciary obligation to the minority is substan-
tially greater in the context of a close corporation, where management and ownership are
substantially identical, than it would be in a larger or less closely held enterprise. A close
corporation, he suggested, could be treated by a court of equity as a partnership or joint ven-
ture, and, to reach a fair result, a court had the power to dissolve the entity or find a less
drastic remedy, perhaps by itself imposing a buy-sell arrangement upon the parties. Id. at 806,
210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
35 Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 552, 255 N.E.2d at 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
36 See id.
37 It is also possible that Richter had his own reasons for retaining the shares in the realty
corporation when he left Chatham. See note 61 infra.
38 While it is easy to understand Judge Fuld's irritation with the manifest unfairness of the
situation, his attempt to correct a failure of planning by providing for dissolution is a heavy-
handed substitute for a buyout of Nelkin's and Richter's shares by the corporation, a mecha-
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In 1979, the New York legislature, responding in part to Judge
Fuld's position, added section 1104-a to the Business Corporation Law, 39
which allows the holders of twenty percent or more of the outstanding
shares of a corporation to seek dissolution if the directors or those who
control the corporation are guilty of illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive ac-
tions against the minority, or if the property of the corporation is being
looted, wasted, or diverted for noncorporate purposes.40 The courts are
directed, in determining whether to proceed with the involuntary dissolu-
tion, to take into account whether liquidation is the only feasible means
to secure fair return on investment and whether liquidation is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the minority
stockholders. 41 The 1979 legislation, however, probably would not have
provided a remedy for either Richter or Nelkin, because the case did not
present oppressive actions, looting, or a diversion of assets for a
noncorporate purpose.
Case 3
The next case, Lewis v. Steinhart,42 is similar to Nelkin in that it
concerned certain stockholders who were seeking to dissolve the corpo-
rate form. In Lewis, the corporation was formed by the merger of two
companies. The Lewis brothers owned the stock of one of the compa-
nies, and Steinhart and Simon owned that of the other. Each of the two
groups held fifty percent of the stock of the corporation resulting from
the merger, and the four stockholders were the sole directors. There was
an agreement that provided that if any one of the four decided to with-
draw from the business, he was required to offer his stock, pro rata, to
the other three. If not accepted by one of them, the stock was to be
offered to the corporation. If the corporation did not accept, it was to be
dissolved.
43
According to the court, a major difference arose between the two
groups, and one of the Lewis brothers, Martin Lewis, offered his stock
proportionately to the other three. His brother refused his proportionate
nism that would ordinarily be provided for in such a situation.
39 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104-a (McKinney 1986).
40 Id.
41 Id. A companion provision, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1118 (McKinney 1986), allows the
corporation, or one or more other stockholders, to respond to the petition for dissolution by
purchasing the petitioner's stock at fair value within 90 days of the filing of the petition and
also allows the court to determine fair value if the corporation or other stockholders and the
petitioner cannot agree. For an analysis of the legislative solution, see Davidian, Corporate
Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 St. John's L.
Rev. 24 (1981).
42 40 A.D.2d 817, 338 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1972) (per curiam).
43 Id. at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Steuer, J., dissenting).
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share, probably by plan, which apparently frustrated that option.44 In
accordance with the agreement, Martin then offered his stock to the cor-
poration. At the meeting called to accept or reject the offer, neither of
the Lewis brothers attended, and therefore a quorum could not be ob-
tained.45 In the action, Steinhart and Simon challenged the intentional
paralysis of the business and the frustration of the corporate purpose.4 6
The Appellate Division sustained the right (with one judge forcefully dis-
senting) of the Lewis brothers to frustrate the purposes of the contract
and to compel dissolution. 47
From the brief decision, one can only speculate that the Lewis
brothers felt they would be better off either dissolving the corporation
and taking back the business they had contributed (which would be the
corporate equivalent of a divorce) or forcing the sale of the business to
third parties than they would be selling out to their co-venturers, Stein-
hart and Simon.48 The case is interesting because the parties made a
series of moves, as in a chess game, to get to the corporate equivalent of a
stalemate: deadlock, with only one remedy, corporate dissolution. There
are innumerable cases in which the parties make a series of moves to
effect a change of relative position. While only some have precedential
value, all are enlightening.49 The complexity of the corporate form, even
in such a small business, often frustrates contractual arrangements.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 817-18, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 817, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
49 For example, in Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470
(1969), there were three stockholders who had been doing business together in various corpo-
rate ventures for more than 25 years when personal disputes affected their business relation-
ships. There were $2,500 in fees owing to each of the stockholders, which two of the partners
wanted to reinvest in the business. The third refused to reinvest the fees. See id. at 516, 249
N.E.2d at 362, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 474. Two of the principals caused the corporation to declare a
dividend to each of the stockholders of $2,500. The two then caused the corporation to sell
common shares, subject to the preemptive rights of all stockholders to participate ratably. The
price of $100 for the shares was substantially under the book value of the outstanding shares.
Id. The dissident stockholder director took the dividend and did not reinvest the money, as
the other two stockholders knew he would. One year later the stockholders liquidated the
corporation, and the two principals received $18,885 for their shares; the stockholder who had
refused to reinvest received only $3,147 for his shares. Id. at 517, 249 N.E.2d at 362, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 474. A series of clever strategic moves by the two principals, reflecting their
psychological assessment of the third party's reactions, led to an interesting lawsuit about the
scope and limits of preemptive rights. The New York Court of Appeals, however, seeking a
fair result, held that when the issuing price for shares in a close corporation is markedly below
book value and when certain stockholder-directors, but not others, would benefit from such
issuance, the directors must show that the price is within a range justifiable by valid business
reasons. Id. at 520, 249 N.E.2d at 364, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 477. This case created unsophistica-
ted and troublesome law in the area of corporate finance.
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Case 4
The three cases described above concern stockholders trying to get
out of the corporate form or to get cash for their investment. The final
case deals with a stockholder trying to remain a stockholder. In Bryan v.
Brock & Blevens Co.,50 Robert Bryan was employed by Brock & Blevens
for approximately fifteen years, rising from his entry position to Execu-
tive Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors. He resigned
in a management dispute.51 He was determined to maintain his status as
a stockholder, although the company management insisted that there
was a long-standing policy of having only active employees as stockhold-
ers.52 Pursuant to this policy, the management and all other employees
formed a shell corporation, merged it into Brock & Blevens, and
squeezed out Bryan at what they regarded as a fair price.5 3 Bryan chal-
lenged the merger transaction in federal district court under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 193454 as a fraudulent device and a
manipulative use of the Georgia merger statute, 55 which was patterned
after the New York merger statute.5 6 The gravamen of the complaint
was breach of fiduciary duty.57 Finding that there was no business pur-
pose for the merger, the court held for Bryan and forced the corporation
to retain him as a stockholder.5 8
THE TROUBLESHOOTER'S ANALYSIS
Analysis of the cases described above need not end at the point of
litigation, leaving the student to parse through the reasons for the dispute
and determine which side had better arguments for a fair resolution.
Each case is subject to a further analysis-that of the hypothetical
troubleshooter who is called in by one of the parties after problems have
developed. This analysis looks to the reasons why the parties first came
together and the objectives they tried to achieve by entering their ar-
rangements, and explores the risks the parties and their counsel con-
sciously assumed and the rewards they perceived the arrangements
would bring. Such an analysis exposes the problems that the parties
faced when they entered into their arrangements and scrutinizes the reso-
50 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
51 Id. at 565.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 567.
54 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
55 Bryan, 490 F.2d at 567-68.
56 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623 (McKinney 1986); see Bryan, 490 F.2d at 569.
57 Bryan, 490 F.2d at 570-71.
59 Id. at 571. The holding in Bryan was subsequently rejected in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977), which held that there is no federal cause of action under § 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for breach of fiduciary duty.
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lutions they chose. The compromises resulting from negotiated solutions
are often evident, including the use and abuse of negotiating leverage or
changes in such leverage in the course of the transaction.5 9 This analysis
allows one to determine whether the dispute occurred because the parties
had an inherently limited vision of future events (or treated certain of the
risks as too remote to provide for in the arrangements) or whether the
dispute could have been anticipated. Our perspective in a trouble-
shooter's analysis is that of the sophisticated, knowledgeable counsellor
examining matters after the fact. If the problem that arose could have
been anticipated, there may have been a failure of planning. If the prob-
lem could not reasonably have been anticipated (or was too remote a risk
to provide for specifically), one has to explore whether other procedures
customarily adopted by parties entering into similar arrangements
would, in a meaningful way, have allowed the parties to avoid the
problems that later led to the dispute or have resolved the dispute itself
once it arose.
Examined from this perspective, the cases presented here for the
most part represent failures of planning. Failure in each case is related to
the lack of thought, at the time the initial arrangements were made, given
to what would happen to the parties over time. In each of the cases the
dispute arose from the limits of the parties' vision-but more skillful
planners would have anticipated the problems. There is a simple remedy
in each case (apparent even without the benefit of hindsight) which, had
it been applied at the outset, would have achieved a reasonable result.
For example, the relentlessness of the tontine in the Allen case and the
years of unproductive investment in the Nelkin case could have been sub-
stantially ameliorated by placing a time limit on the arrangements, such
as five or ten years.60 In Nelkin, Charles Richter could have avoided the
problem he was later to face if his shares in the realty company had been
held as an asset of Chatham so that he would have received value for the
realty shares when he sold his interest in Chatham. 61 In Lewis, Steinhart
59 In all the cases, access to the courts can be looked upon as a negotiating lever in situa-
tions in which the plaintiff (in Bryan, the defendant) has lost substantial bargaining power.
60 Even if one views the stockholder arrangement in Allen as indicating that the parties
intended the rewards of stock ownership to come from a favored position as a customer in
dealing with Biltmore Tissue and realized that such favored dealing would limit the value of
the stock, one must determine whether the arrangement reflected the parties' limited percep-
tion. Were the original stockholders unable to perceive the possible independent value of the
company or was this value one that they were willing to forego in favor of the interests of those
continuing as stockholders in the corporation?
61 It is possible, of course, that Richter's problem reflected his own incorrect perception of
likely future events. An alternative interpretation of the facts of the case is that in 1946, when
Richter sold his stock in Chatham and retained his stock in the realty company, he intention-
ally held onto the stock of the realty corporation, speculating that a post-World War II rise in
real estate values would make the sale of the building likely. (There may always have been an
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and Simon obviously could obtain the money needed to buy out the
Lewis brothers (otherwise they would not have sued to prevent dissolu-
tion), but the arrangement either did not allow them to pool their capital
with the corporation's capital, did not provide for non-pro-rata
purchases if one of the parties declined to purchase, or did not provide
for purchases within groups of stockholders to avoid a change of control.
These failures could have been corrected. In Bryan, the corporate
purpose of having only active employees as stockholders could easily
have been implemented by providing that the employee had to sell to the
corporation or the other stockholders all stock held, at its appraised
value, at the time of termination of employment. Management probably
articulated this corporate purpose only after Bryan had resigned. Ad-
vance planning would have avoided the creation of bad law.
THE PLANNER'S APPROACH AND ANALYSIS
For the planner, the cases are not only the subject matter of retro-
spective analysis, but also an opportunity to explore a problem of organi-
zation or a type of transaction that others have faced, and to derive from
their experience a guide to future planning. The cases become a means of
exploring the problems of limited vision, and, as such, each of the cases
yields rules of application. Some of these rules are procedural and others
substantive, but each conveys legal experience and provides guidance for
dealing with limited vision. To the student of planning, these rules are as
important as the holding in each case.
We have extracted a number of rules from the cases, both primary
guidelines and correlative ones. None of the rules are definitive; they are
merely suggestions for responding to complex situations. No one rule or
guideline is more important than any other, nor are they presented in a
sequence in which any one rule is meant to be derived logically from any
other. The importance of any rule depends upon the purpose the parties
seek to achieve.
Rule 1. The law's view of the degree of oppression that constitutes
behavior for which a remedy will be provided is much higher than any
shareholder would ordinarily tolerate as the threshold for a remedy.62
Accordingly, the parties should determine the limits of their tolerance
and provide contractually for the appropriate remedies once that thresh-
expectation among the stockholders that the building would eventually be sold.). In that case,
the limits of his vision explain the dispute. Richter, in effect, held a warrant on a portion of the
equity of the realty corporation. The dispute arose later, because Nelkin had received no com-
pensation on the termination of his tenancy and was left having to rent space elsewhere at fair
market value.
62 See, e.g., Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d
454 (1969).




Rule 2. Any arrangement that lasts forever will eventually cause
mischief.63 Accordingly, time limits should be considered in all
arrangements.
Rule 3. Joint ventures with equal ownership require a mechanism
to break a deadlock.64 If no such mechanism is provided at the outset,
the venture will become merely a temporary arrangement similar to a
tenancy at will, and the parties must accept eventual corporate dissolu-
tion, which will limit the scope of the enterprise and the capital commit-
ted to it.
Rule 4. If the parties can dissolve the corporate arrangement by
being deadlocked, contractual arrangements linked to the corporate form
will be totally frustrated.6 5 This rule can be considered a corollary to
Rule 3 above, although it has a larger scope. Moreover, there is an addi-
tional corollary: If there is a significant loophole in any arrangement,
that loophole will in time be discovered and thereafter exploited.
66
Rule 5. Unless an enterprise is prepared to have stockholders who
have no connection with the business, there must be buyout
arrangements. 6
7
Rule 6. A shift (even a slight shift) in need, loyalty, or point of view
in any member of a group can cause a change of corporate control. Inev-
itably, people die. Accordingly, members of the majority can become
members of the minority. 68 (If one of the Lewis brothers had had a fall-
ing out with the other, corporate control would have changed, or if Chat-
ham had sided with Richter, 69 control would have changed.) In all cases,
the rights of the minority must be fully understood, for in some cases
those rights may become the rights of former members of the majority.
As a corollary: In counting heads among stockholders, you have to
count the number of shares held by each group, not the number of shares
63 See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevens Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974); Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454; Alien v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
64 See, e.g., Lewis v. Steinhart, 40 A.D.2d 817, 338 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1972) (per curiam).
65 See, e.g., id. at 817-18, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54; Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 545, 255 N.E.2d at
715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
66 See, e.g., Lewis, 40 A.D.2d at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
67 See, e.g., Bryan, 490 F.2d at 566-67.
68 See, e.g., Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 255 N.E.2d at 714-15, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 455-56;
Lewis, 40 A.D.2d at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Steuer, J., dissenting). There may also be
family ties to contend with. See, e.g., Lewis, 40 A.D.2d at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Steuer, J.,
dissenting) (the Lewises); Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 544 n.1, 255 N.E.2d at 714 n.1, 307 N.Y.S.2d
at 455 n.1 (the Horowitzes).
69 This did not happen, but it helps to explain National's willingness to allow Chatham to
occupy additional space in the building shortly before the start of litigation. See Nelkin, 25
N.Y.2d at 547, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
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held by individuals. 70
Rule 7. The majority can oppress the minority, and in an infinite
number of ways. 71 For example, the majority can siphon off earnings
through salary increases72 and dilute the equity of the minority by grant-
ing options. Claims of breach of fiduciary duty may not always provide a
remedy when a remedy is needed.73 Also, as a corollary, the majority
can always feel justified in eliminating the minority and is capable of
doing that at times convenient to the majority (in terms of value of the
enterprise) and not convenient to the minority.74 The minority's plan-
ning strategy must take into account the areas of the minority's greatest
vulnerability.
Rule 8. The minority can oppress the majority, but only in a limited
number of ways. 75 It is therefore often possible to anticipate the strategy
that will be followed by the minority. Failure so to anticipate can result
in a failure of planning.
Rule 9. Any arrangement that does not provide for changes in the
value of an enterprise over time will become oppressive to someone.76
Rule 10. Parties differently situated require different treatment.77
In Nelkin, most of the parties held the stock of the realty corporation
separately, which caused a significant problem. As a corollary, if there is
more than one point of view, which there usually is in these arrange-
ments-for example, the difference between the money and the manage-
ment-there should be more than one lawyer representing the points of
view rather than one lawyer trying to seek neutral principles for all.
Rule 11. Objectives that are fundamental to the organization of the
70 See Lewis, 40 A.D.2d at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Steuer, J., dissenting). The stock-
holder agreement in Lewis mistakenly assumed that four 25% stock holdings needed to be
balanced. In fact, there were two groups of 50% that required balancing. As a result, the
stockholder agreement was doomed to fail from the start. If a member of one group was
obliged to offer his shares pro rata to all the other stockholders, by being bought out he would
be transferring control to the rival group.
71 See, e.g., Bryan, 490 F.2d at 564-67; Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 255 N.E.2d at 714-
15, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 455-56; Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1965); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963). See gener-
ally F. O'Neal & R. Thompson, Oppression of Minority Shareholders (1985) (two-volume
treatise focusing on squeeze-outs and other oppressive conduct in incorporated business
enterprises).
72 See, e.g., Kruger, 16 N.Y.2d at 802, 210 N.E.2d at 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
73 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
74 See, e.g., Bryan, 490 F.2d at 567 (describing one method of freezing out the minority).
75 See, e.g., id. at 566-67 (minority shareholder refused three buyout offers from the
company).
76 See, e.g., Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 255 N.E.2d at 714-15, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 455-56;
Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 535-36, 141 N.E.2d 812, 813-14, 161 N.Y.S.2d
418, 419-20 (1957).
77 See, e.g., Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
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enterprise should never be changed without the consent of all parties. 78
This rule can be considered a corollary of Rule 7.
Rule 12. The manager of the corporation has no legal obligation to
distribute the wealth of the corporation.79 The corollary: if the parties
are not equally situated, there is room for oppression.
Rule 13. Employment is controlled by the majority.
80
Rule 14. If the parties do not provide a means for the corporation
or for other stockholders to buy the shares of minority stockholders,
there may never be a market for the shares.81 This is exemplified by the
dilemma into which Richter and then Nelkin fell.82 Contrast Rule 5,
where the minority neither needs nor desires a market for the shares.
Rule 15. Any solution that looks to the courts is a lengthy and
costly process. Moreover, the parties rarely go to court when the shoe
first begins to pinch. All the cases illustrate this rule. A corollary:
agreements rarely succeed in documenting the parties' arrangements
fully. By the time the controversy reaches the courts, the documents
often seem opaque with regard to what the contracting parties were at-
tempting to accomplish. All the cases illustrate this point.
THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
We have only scratched the surface with respect to the issues raised
by the four cases. They represent an introduction to the subject matter
and a point of departure for further study. The cases that would logi-
cally follow Bryan explore going-private transactions and stockholder
squeeze-outs and thus anticipate Rule 13e-3 under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,83 which marks the coming together of fiduciary
standards under state corporate law and administrative oversight under
federal law. 84 Going-private transactions, such as leveraged buyouts,
78 See id.
7) See, e.g., id. at 545-46, 255 N.E.2d at 716-17, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57; Kruger v. Gerth,
16 N.Y.2d 802, 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (1965).
80 See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevens Co., 490 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974).
81 See, e.g., Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 545, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
82 See id. (when Richter and Nelkin offered to sell their stock to majority shareholders,
majority offered to pay only what Richter and Nelkin had originally paid for the stock, 27
years earlier).
83 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1987).
84 Among the cases that lead from Bryan to Rule 13e-3 are Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1976) (Supreme Court reluctant to use Rule lOb-5 to federalize body of state corpo-
rate law dealing with securities transactions); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977) (parent corporation may not effect merger involving subsidiary for sole purpose of elimi-
nating minority without valid business purpose); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983) (business purpose requirement with respect to parent-subsidiary mergers no longer in
effect in Delaware), and two Securities and Exchange Commission proceedings, In re Woods
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 15,334, 16 SEC Docket 166 (Nov. 29, 1978) (enforcement
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raise, often on a much larger scale, the issues of organizing close corpora-
tions with complex capital structures.8 5
The four cases also introduce transaction planning concepts, the
various methods of organizing entities around the money and the brains
(common structuring problems in leveraged buyouts). Inherent in all
these cases is an understanding of the risks that are involved and the
problems that ensue when the parties have different objectives and differ-
ent capital commitments. Exploring this subject matter could lead one to
other cases, which would reveal further experience and develop addi-
tional guidelines and correlative rules.
A NEW PERSPECTIVE
The four cases are considered here as cases involving the close cor-
poration. Each, however, involves at least one other subject matter:
Allen, from the plaintiff's perspective, can be seen as a lesson in estate
planning; Nelkin is a real estate transaction or a case involving tax plan-
proceeding finding substantive violation of Federal disclosure rules in public filings relating to
going-private transactions structured under state corporate law); In re Spartek Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 15,567 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 81,961 (Feb. 14,
1979) (enforcement proceeding finding substantive violation of Federal disclosure rules in pub-
lic filings relating to going-private transactions structured under state corporate law). Bryan
can also profitably be seen in the context of cases involving partnership arrangements. Part-
nerships provide a legal context different from that of the close corporation. As a result, simi-
lar problems in the partnership context, such as the illiquidity of the investment and the death
of one of the principals, can often have solutions different from those in the corporate context.
This, in turn, provides an insight into the effect of various rules on the planning and thus the
negotiations of the parties.
85 We note that very few major law schools continue to teach close corporation or partner-
ship law, and yet these courses are ideal for teaching students the elements of planning. More-
over, these cases are as important for practice as the latest pronouncements of the Delaware
Supreme Court on the business judgment rule. The traditional subject matter of such courses
does not readily indicate that partnerships and close corporations have become structures that
encompass more than small businesses; they are often the vehicle of choice for entities that
have capitalizations in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars and, as a result, are
significant for the most sophisticated corporate practices. Perhaps a change of course title
would attract more attention from law schools as well as from students.
In a close corporation form of organization, the capital structure of a typical leveraged
buyout reveals the problems in planning that confront the counsellor in devising stockholder
arrangements. For example, in a leveraged buyout, the stockholders of the continuing corpo-
ration following the buyout often consist of members of senior management of the company,
the investment bank that structured the buyout, and the institutional lenders to the transaction
who have provided subordinated debt. Thus, in the 1985 leveraged buyout of Levi Strauss &
Co., the equity of a major corporation was purchased by fewer than 60 persons. The execu-
tives are likely to have some sort of stock option program, and the subordinated lenders may
have convertible securities. There may be several classes of common stock and preferred
stock. A detailed stock subscription agreement or stockholders' agreement is required to pro-
vide for the many future events that will affect these parties' relationship as stockholders. For
example, executives will retire or otherwise terminate employment, the company may be sold
as an entirety, its stock may again be offered to the public, or it may again be recapitalized.
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ning;86 Lewis is a case study in mergers and acquisitions involving the
failure of a merger of equals; and Bryan can be seen as a study in execu-
tive compensation from the management's point of view, with the at-
tempted squeeze-out of the minority stockholder revealing the failure of
the compensation policy. Bryan also demonstrates how a plaintiff could
take advantage of then-existing interpretations of federal securities laws
to pursue a claim in federal court, a forum he evidently thought would be
more sympathetic to his position than state court.
The problems these cases address, therefore, are common to such
far-ranging subjects as estate planning, taxes, corporate organizations,
real estate financing, domestic relations, and federal jurisdiction. All fu-
ture-looking matters have common planning elements.87 The cases we
have chosen should be seen as examples and are not meant to suggest
limits to the applicability of the analysis. Accordingly, the analysis that
we have made of the cases in the close corporation can be made in other
areas of substantive law.
If the cases are analyzed from the perspective of the legal experience
they convey and are explored from the troubleshooter's perspective,
looking back from the onset of litigation, and the planner's perspective,
looking to the time the agreements were first negotiated and searching
for rules of application, they lead to an appreciation of the difference in
quality between well and poorly thought out arrangements.
Unless you examine the cases for their planning content, you may
find contracts documenting common business arrangements to be com-
pletely indecipherable. The troubleshooter's and planner's analyses of
the cases admit one to the world of those who negotiate contractual ar-
rangements that are meant to document and apportion the risks that the
parties face. They also admit one to the world of counselling and the
problems caused by the planner's limited ability to foresee all possible
risks and the practical contraints on his drafting, such as the conscious
decision not to provide for risks that are perceived as remote.88
86 By holding the stock of the realty corporation as individuals, Epstein, the Horowitzes,
and Richter may have intended, in the event the building was sold, to avoid paying tax on the
gain at the intermediate corporate level.
87 Louis Brown has suggested that "[t]hinking like a lawyer in the realm of future facts" is
an undeveloped opportunity for the legal curriculum to explore. Brown, supra note 2, at 1347
n.9; see also Brown & Dauer, A Synopsis of the Theory and Practice of Preventive Law, in The
Lawyer's Handbook § A, ch.3, at A3-1 (A.B.A. rev. ed. 1982 Supp.). Brown and Dauer, in
proposing a discipline of "preventive law," note that planning concerns cut across various
areas of practice. "Although drafting wills is in substance a very different thing from forming
multiple-corporation joint ventures, there are nevertheless techniques of planning (and of
thinking about planning) common to all future-looking transactional matters." Brown &
Dauer, supra, at A3-2.
88 Creating any arrangement that entails the parties' exposure to risks from changing cir-
cumstances can be viewed as a process of attempting to encompass and account for such risks.
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The cases provide something more for both the counsellor and the
advocate: procedural experience. For example, they provide an under-
standing of what constitutes the irreparable injury necessary to obtain an
injunction and the delay inherent in trying to obtain relief from the
courts. 89 Implicit in the guidelines listed above is a series of judgments
about the way the courts function, an understanding that is essential to
counselling.
The text of an agreement is rarely, if ever, examined in law school.
Courses in contracts deal with the construction of contractual obligations
and remedies for breach.90 The type of analysis of the cases that has been
offered in this Essay is a necessary predicate for any course on counsel-
ling or negotiation. Without such analysis, counselling and negotiation
have no content; they are merely procedural subjects. And, as such, they
are not very meaningful.
One cannot become a planner without engaging in planning, in fac-
ing problems and solving them. Experience does not develop without
trial and error as necessary elements of the process: we have to see and
experience the limits of our vision. This explains the strong interest on
the part of students in clinical education.
But there must first be an understanding that people's objectives di-
rectly affect the applicability and meaning of the rules they use. For ex-
ample, determining whether a corporate structure should transcend the
One can think of the process, metaphorically, as creating a series of concentric circles, with the
more remote risks in the arrangements encompassed by the outer rings. The greater the
number of circles, the more complex are the arrangements, and the more difficult are the terms
to negotiate. Every circle reflects compromises, and the greater the number of compromises,
the more likely one or more of the parties will become dissatisfied. Arrangements that cover
certain remote risks and ignore others can be seen metaphorically as ellipses. A student should
be given the opportunity to explore the outer rings and make perfect circles of the ellipses
presented by the cases. In practice, the most elegantly executed arrangements cover only real
risks and have a small number of perfect circles. The ability to construct such arrangements
comes with experience.
Even an apparently minor concern, such as the use of a severability clause in a contract,
opens up options for the planner and admits the student to a view of the series of concentric
circles that the planner manipulates in defining the essence of the bargain or the arrangement
(whether the solution is contractual or legislative). The severability clause is a device to save
part of an arrangement when other parts are determined to be unenforceable. How effective is
the clause? How adventuresome can a planner be in drafting these clauses without jeopardiz-
ing the whole? How deep can you cut and still not cut out the essence of the contract? All of
these are issues the planner must confront in making his arrangements.
89 See, e.g., Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d
454 (1969).
90 The typical first-year contracts course, it has been noted, is an abstraction dealing with
principles of contract law and with little reference to the particular types of contracts being
discussed. See Gorman, supra note 2, at 612-13. We are not suggesting here that such an
approach should change the first-year course. It is in the advanced courses that the content of
the contracts-in other words, their substance-deserves further consideration.
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impermanence of the parties' relationship or whether it should terminate
at the whim of any one party requires a resolution of points of view and
an accommodation of the parties to various competing rules. In every
arrangement one has to account for the fact that people die, they may
change their homes and their businesses, they make friends and enemies,
they fall in and out of love, and they are subject to the economic forces
that affect everyone, like the rise and fall of oil prices. The cases provide
experience as to these matters and more. It is the awareness that change
affects arrangements that makes lawyers worldly. A law school educa-
tion should open the young lawyer's eyes to the consequences of change.
That kind of intellectual awareness creates the apperceptive mass for the
knowledgeable planner, allowing an extension of the limits of vision.
In law school, courses rarely explore the way different objectives
interrelate with rules and the various kinds of strategies and resolutions
that can be developed where parties have competing desires. And that is
what students often look for when they seek clinical experience, for it is
what will occur in practice. However, without the intellectual analysis of
the layer of experience offered by cases looked at from the trouble-
shooter's and the planner's point of view, clinical experience provides
only limited data. There is often not enough understanding of the con-
text of the problem faced in the clinic to make the problem a real learn-
ing experience.
A course directed at troubleshooting and planning may require new
textbooks. The experience students require is set forth in the cases. But
the cases in typical law school texts are often edited extensively, to em-
phasize the conflicts in the arguments. They rarely contain the underly-
ing documents, the materials that form the basis of contention. A
coursebook designed for the teaching of counsellor's law might well pro-
vide the agreements themselves following the cases so that the subject
matter that formed the arrangement and caused argument can be under-
stood. Disputes, as we have shown, focus attention on the objectives of
the parties and thus on their planning. The documents show the risks
that were covered and the risks that were taken in the initial planning
stages. In finding the objectives and re-creating the planning process, we
learn from the failures of others.
Law schools have for years been trying to develop a viable curricu-
lum for the third year, when the core courses have been mastered and
summer jobs have given students a taste of the profession. The sugges-
tion made in this Essay could furnish significant content for the end of
the second year and part of the third year of law school. Whereas the
typical first-year course presents a large number of cases heavily edited to
stress particular legal points, a course in planning would present a rela-
tively small number of cases to be analyzed in detail, so that the situa-
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tions can emerge in the round. Viewed from the counsellor's perspective,
the cases hold a rich vein of experience that can provide intellectual con-
tent and give the student a sense of what can make the practice of the
profession rewarding. One can also begin to sense the excitement of deal-
ing with the limits of one's vision in making arrangements and seeking
solutions.91
This brings us to the point of redefining the role of the counsellor
and counsellor's law. The counsellor's role is misunderstood in the tradi-
tional legal curriculum. In the definitional model, based on advocacy,
the counsellor (or office lawyer, to use the more derogatory term) has
little role in the evolution of law. In fact, the counsellor can be bold and
aggressive and can choose to pursue litigation as well as try to avoid it.92
All lawyers function as both counsellors and advocates. Advocates
have to advise clients as to projected outcomes, the risks inherent in pur-
suing a litigation solution, and the possible results that follow from a
negotiated settlement or solution. The advocate in that role first takes up
the troubleshooter's position and then becomes a planner. The counsel-
lor, regardless of whether he ever goes into court, is guided in creating
the arrangements by his view of the development of the law in the legisla-
ture and in the courts and the consequences of court action. He is also
an advocate for the client in a variety of contexts. There is thus a cross-
over in terms of function. The good litigator is a sensible counsellor, and
the good counsellor is sensible as to the potential benefits and detriments
of litigation. There is much more overlap than would appear on the sur-
face or in the law school classroom. And for both the counsellor and the
advocate, the cases provide the experiential data (as well as the rules) for
decision making.
CONCLUSION
The dichotomy between advocate's law and counsellor's law that is
expressed and experienced in law school is a construct of legal education
and is never so starkly experienced after the student graduates. The rea-
son is that the cases read in law school are studied mostly for the quality
of argument and not for the content and data that are essential for the
91 Robert A. Gorman has stressed the need for truly advanced law school courses, noting
that the typical "advanced" course deals with more of the same kinds of materials handled in
the introductory course. According to Gorman, a "[t]ruly 'advanced' study of a field must
offer a sense of progressive challenge, and of increased methodological diversity and sophistica-
tion." Gorman, supra note 2, at 612.
92 While it is the conventional view that the litigator, rather than the counsellor, makes
law, in practice it is often the reverse. The counsellor can make law by choosing to pursue
litigation, with the litigator merely carrying out the chosen course. Planners thus make law
not only as reformers through the legislative and law-reform-commission routes, as has been
noted, see Korngold, supra note 2, at 623, but also as corporate practitioners.
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lawyer who uses the law. When the cases are used as a source of experi-
ence, the dichotomy between advocate's law and counsellor's law is re-
vealed as an arbitrary construct. When the cases are so used, the lawyer
becomes a troubleshooter and a planner (more worldly than his fellows)
with the ability to get things done.
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